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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
vs. : 
JESSIE JIMINEZ, : Case No. 870399-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals on September 14, 1988. Originally, this case 
involved an appeal by the State from the Order of the trial court 
dismissing the charge of Assault by a Prison, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding. In its 
opinion, this Court vacated the dismissal order and remanded the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. A copy of this 
Court's decision is attached hereto as Addendum A. In this 
petition, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider its decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 14, 1987, Jessie Jiminez was arrested on the 
charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, and transported by 
police officers to the Salt Lake County Jail. State v. Jimmez, 
Case No. 870399-CA, slip op., (September 14, 1988)(see Addendum A at 
1). The State alleged that during the booking process, Ms. Jimmez 
assaulted the arresting officer (R16, 17, 35), 
Defense counsel filed a Formal Request for Discovery on 
March 23, 1987 (R7-8). At a hearing in Circuit Court prior to June 
11, 1987, the date on which the preliminary hearing in the instant 
case was held, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that a 
videotape of the incident existed.1 Shortly after the preliminary 
hearing and as a result of the information from the prosecutor 
regarding the existence of a videotape of the incident, defense 
counsel filed a second motion for discovery, specifically requesting 
"any videotapes taken of the alleged incident" (R21). 
The State failed to respond to this second motion until 
asked directly by the court to do so. A minute entry dated July 31, 
1987 shows that a substitute prosecutor who was unfamiliar with the 
case appeared and informed the Court that the State did not have a 
video (R24). The State was not prepared to argue the motion, and 
the trial court continued the hearing to August 7 and ordered the 
State to respond specifically as to whether a videotape capturing 
the incident had been made, what was on that tape, whether the tape 
had been destroyed and how. On August 7, 1987, the State again 
appeared through a substitute prosecutor who was unfamiliar with the 
case. At that time, the substitute prosecutor filed the State's 
response to the defendant's July 2 motion. 
1 Because the State did not order a transcript of the 
proceedings in this case, this information is not contained in the 
record. 
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After a hearing on the Defendants Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to preserve evidence held on August 21, 1987, the trial 
judge granted the Motion to Dismiss (R31). The prosecutor then 
prepared a written order for the judge to sign which was not 
approved by the defendant (R40-1). That Order stated in part: 
that the charge of Assault by a Prisoner . . . is 
dismissed for the reason that the State failed to 
retain any videotape of the incident at the Salt 
Lake County Jail. 
(R40-41, Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court penalized respondent for the appellant's failure 
to order the preparation of a transcript and reached its decision 
based on speculation as to what occurred in the trial court. As a 
result of the incomplete record and lack of transcripts of relevant 
proceedings, this Court must presume the findings and conclusion of 
the trial court to be correct. 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Brown v. Pickard, denying 
reh'g, 11 P.512 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred m its conclusions . . . . 
- 3 -
11 P. at 512. Later in Cummmgs v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this 
Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result. . 
. . If there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for rehearing should be promptly filed 
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P.2d at 624. The argument section of this 
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition 
for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. 
In its opinion in State v. Jiminez, Case No. 870299-CA, 
slip op. (September 14, 1988)(Addendum A) this Court overlooked or 
misapprehend points of law and fact which would materially affect 
the result in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. 
THIS COURT PENALIZED RESPONDENT FOR THE 
APPELLANTS FAILURE TO ORDER THE PREPARATION OF A 
TRANSCRIPT AND REACHED ITS DECISION BASED ON 
SPECULATION AS TO WHAT OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Rule 11(e)(1) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals 
requires that within ten days of filing the notice of appeal, the 
- 4 -
appellant shall request that the reporter prepare a transcript of 
pertinent portions of the proceedings or file a Certificate with the 
Court stating that no transcripts have been ordered. 
Rule 11(e)(2) requires that lf[i]f the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or 
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such a finding or 
conclusion." 
In this case, the appellant urged on appeal that the trial 
court's conclusion was erroneous, but did not order a transcript of 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss or any other proceedings. In 
its decision, this court stated: 
Since Jiminez offered no evidence that a 
videotape of the alleged assault was made or of 
what it most likely showed, no one knows whether 
there was any evidence. Thus, we are left to 
speculate on whether any "evidence" was destroyed. 
State v. Jiminez, slip op. at 3. 
Such a conclusion is erroneous since without reviewing the 
entire record, this Court is simply speculating that there was no 
evidence that a videotape of the incident was made, and penalizing 
Ms. Jiminez for the Statefs failure to back up its argument with 
cites to a transcript. This Court has taken the prosecutor's 
assertion somewhat late in the proceedings, on August 7, 1988, that 
the videotape was routinely destroyed as the only "evidence" 
presented and boot strapped that assertion into a conclusion that 
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Ms. Jiminez did not present evidence regarding the existence of a 
videotape material to the case. 
This Court also stated "[n]o evidentiary hearing was 
held." State v. Jiminez, slip op. at 2. Such an assertion is 
simply not clear from the pleadings file and in the absence of a 
transcript. A hearing on the Motion to Compel Further Discovery was 
noticed up for July 31, 1988. A substitute prosecutor appeared at 
that hearing and the Minute Entry for that date pertinent to the 
Motion simply states ffThe State says that they do not have a video" 
(R24). Such a statement sheds no light on whether an evidentiary 
hearing was held at that time. Furthermore, according to defense 
counsel, at that hearing, the trial judge ordered the State to 
investigate the matter and appear prepared to respond specifically 
as to whether a tape capturing the incident was made, whether it was 
destroyed and if so, how. 
The minute entry for August 21, 1987 indicates Defendant's 
/ 
Motion to Dismiss was Argued to the Court and granted (R31). The 
minute entry does not clarify whether stipulations or other evidence 
was presented to the trial court at that time. This Court's 
conclusion that no evidentiary hearing was held and that no evidence 
was presented upon which the trial court could base it's decision is 
A \not supported by the skimpy record provided by Appellant and is 
1
 inaccurate according to what actually transpired in the trial court. 
A s \ Furthermore, this Court determined that the trial court did 
not make a "finding that the tape had recorded the incident, that 
v 
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the tape was material to the defense, or that due process was 
denied." State v. Jimmez/ slip op at 2. Because it did not review 
a transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, this Court is 
without complete information as to the findings of the judge. 
Information such as the prosecutor's statement at the first date 
scheduled for preliminary hearing that a tape of the incident 
existed was not put before the Court because of the State's failure 
to order the transcript. The Court is left to review the trial 
court's order which was prepared by the State and not approved by 
defense counsel (R41)(See Addendum B). Simply because no findings 
were explicitly contained in the order does not mean findings were 
not made. 
Implicit in the order is a finding that the videotape 
existed. A review of the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to 
Dismiss would have elucidated for this Court what findings the judge 
actually made and the basis for his conclusion that the case should 
be dismissed. An inartfully drafted order, or perhaps more 
appropriately, an order artfully drafted by the appellant for this 
Court's review which was not approved by counsel for respondent, is 
not sufficient to support a finding that the judge's conclusion was 
erroneous. Again, Ms. Jiminez was penalized for the State's failure 
to order a transcript of relevant proceedings. 
In Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976), where the 
appellant did not order a transcript of the proceedings, the Utah 
Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant's "points on this 
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appeal involve factual matters which this Court cannot resolve or 
undertake to determine without a transcript of the testimony." Id. 
at 608. The Court pointed out that w[ajppellate review of factual 
matters can be meaningful, orderly and intelligent only in 
juxtaposition to a record by which lower courts rulings and decision 
on disputes can be measured." Id. Based on the appellant's failure 
to order a transcript tf[a]nd, as under elementary principles of 
appellate review we ' . . . presume the findings of the Court to have 
been supported by admissible competent, substantial 
evidence . . . ,f we affirm" Id. at 609. 
In Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that "[w]ithout a transcript the 
trial court's actions are presumed valid [citations omitted]" Id. 
at 918, fn2. See also Estate of Thorley, 579 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 
1978) ("No transcript of the trial is brought here and we therefore 
assume that the proceedings therein were regular and that the 
determination made was supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence" [citations omitted].); Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 
449 (Utah 1981). ("Where no transcript of trial proceedings is 
furnished on appeal, we presume that the evidence at trial was 
sufficient to support the findings and judgment of the trial 
court."); Stephens v. Schwendiman, 688 P.2d 466, 467 (Utah 1984)(per 
curiam); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)(per curiam); 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). 
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In this case, where the appellant did not order a 
transcript of the proceedings, this Court failed to apply 
established principles of appellate procedure and presume the • 
findings of the trial court to be correct. 
Instead, in the absence of a transcript, this Court focused 
on appellant's belated response to a second motion for discovery to 
determine that "the instant case involves the routine erasure of a 
videotape, not known to contain any evidence, before an information 
was ever filed." State v. Jiminez, slip op. at 2. This constitutes 
a finding of fact by the appellate court; however, in the absence of 
a transcript this Court must presume that the trial court's findings 
and conclusions were correct, and cannot make new findings itself 
based on an incomplete record. 
This Court's assertions that "no evidence was presented 
that the video equipment was operating in the booking area on the 
appropriate night and either actually or most likely captured on 
tape the alleged assault "and that defendant thus failed to 
establish the foundational fact of the existence of the 
evidence!.]" (Id, at 2) are similarly flawed. In the absence of a 
transcript of relevant proceedings, this Court has no basis for 
finding such a fact and, as previously noted, the absence of a 
transcript precluded this Court from being made aware that at the 
preliminary hearing, the prosecutor told defense counsel that a tape 
recording the incident existed, in an effort to induce defendant to 
enter a plea. The prosecutor's statement at the preliminary hearing 
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is sufficient for the trial judge to have found that a tape 
capturing the incident existed, that such a tape was not destroyed 
within 72 hours of the incident and that the tape was material 
evidence. 
The circumstances of this case point out precisely why the 
rule requiring the appellate court to presume the correctness of the 
trial court's findings and conclusions where the appellant has not 
ordered a transcript has developed. Without a transcript, the 
State, the appellant in this case, was able to avoid information 
which jeopardized its position and emphasize its own written motions 
and statements, excluding numerous details of what actually 
transpired. In such a situation, the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently penalized the appellant for failure to order a 
transcript by presuming the findings and conclusions of the trail 
court to be correct. In this case, this Court penalized Ms. 
Jimmez, the respondent by finding facts that simply cannot be 
ascertained without a complete record. 
Contrary to this Court's position that Ms. Jimmez offered 
no evidence that a videotape of the incident existed, based on the 
information before him, the trial judge determined that a videotape 
had been made and was material, thereby requiring dismissal. Had 
this Court presumed the findings and conclusions of the trial court 
to be correct, as required where no transcript is ordered, this 
Court would have upheld the dismissal order. 
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Respondent respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
its decision in this matter in light of the above and the argument 
set forth in respondent's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the failure of the appellant to request a 
transcript of relevant proceedings and argument otherwise set 
forward in respondent's brief/ respondent respectfully requests that 
this Court reconsider its decision and affirm the trial court's 
dismissal order. 
DATED this '/ day of October, 1988. 
f JAKES C. BRADSHAW 
[ Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
<j&- c cdcQSf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE 
I, JOAN C. WATT, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for defendant/respondent in this 
case; and, 
(2) this Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /' day of October, 1988. 
<^fae-C$X 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84114 this (1 day of October, 1988. 
L^L 
DELIVERED by this day 
of October, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
Jessie Jiminez/ 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Bench/ Garff and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
The State appeals dismissal of the charge that Ms. Jiminez, 
while in custody/ assaulted a police officer in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978). The issue presented is whether 
defendant made a sufficient showing that a videotape erased at the 
jail was material to her guilt or innocence such that she could not 
receive a fair trial without it. We vacate the dismissal order. 
On March 14, 1987# Ms. Jiminez was arrested on a charge of 
driving under the influence of alcohol and transported by police 
officers to the Salt Lake County Jail for booking. The State 
alleged that Ms. Jiminez assaulted an officer during the booking 
process. Four days later, a separate information was filed against 
Ms. Jiminez for this assault/ stating that the defendant kicked an 
officer in the stomach. Four witnesses to the alleged assault were 
listed/ including the victim/officer. Following a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. 
Subsequent to the preliminary hearing and about four months 
after the alleged assault/ defendant filed a discovery motion 
seeking "any videotapes taken of the alleged [assault] incident.M 
The State responded that/ as part of standard jail procedure, the 
videotape of all bookings, including defendant's, was erased and 
recycled after seventy-two hours if there was no request to retain 
it. 
Based on the State's response, defendant moved to dismiss the 
assault charge. She asserted in her supporting memorandum that the 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870399-CA 
f; 
F I L E D 
SUL£?L6<%. 
KU:V T. Noonsn 
Ciiir'r. or the Court 
'Utah Court oi Appeals 
assault incident had, in fact, been recorded on videotape at the 
jail and that the tape was material to her defense. No evidentiary 
hearing was held. After oral arguments on the motion, the trial 
court dismissed the charge "for the reason that the State failed to 
retain any videotape of the incident." There was no finding that 
the tape had recorded the incident, that the tape was material to 
the defense, or that due process was denied. 
Defendant argued to the trial court that the State had a duty to 
preserve all material evidence and that destruction of material 
evidence denied her due process, relying principally upon People v. 
Harmes, 38 Colo. App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976). In Harmes, however, 
the destroyed videotape was known to have recorded the alleged 
assault by defendant. Id. at 472. Thus, 
[t]he evidence destroyed was known to be 
material and critical, and not merely 
incidental to, the question of defendant's 
guilt or innocence, and therefore, the 
duty to preserve the film for its 
evidentiary value was apparent. 
Id. at 473. Harmes's counsel was informed at the preliminary 
hearing that the tape would be held by the police as evidence 
against him. A week before the scheduled trial, however, the police 
disclosed that the videotape had been inadvertently erased. The 
Colorado court stated, MThis is not a case, therefore, in which 
inadequate investigation resulted in the careless destruction of 
evidence not known to be material at the time." Id. (emphasis 
added). It was only by showing both the existence and the negligent 
destruction of the material evidence that Harmes established a 
sufficient factual foundation to support, his claim of due process 
denial. Id. 
In contrast, the instant case involves the routine erasure of a 
videotape, not known to contain any evidence, before an information 
was ever filed on the assault charge. Although defense counsel 
claimed that the erased videotape contained evidence material to the 
defense, no evidence was presented that the video equipment was 
operating in the booking area on the appropriate night and either 
actually or most likely captured on tape the alleged assault. 
Defendant thus failed to establish the foundational fact of the 
existence of evidence. 
As a general rule, a defendant is denied a constitutionally 
guaranteed fair trial if, after request, the prosecution suppresses 
evidence favorable to defendant that is material to guilt or to 
punishment. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Utah 1986). 
See State v. Stewart. 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 19.75). The Utah Supreme 
Court has explained that the required materiality is more than 
880121-CA 2 
evidentiary materiality; the evidence must be material in the 
constitutional sense- State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 
1983). 
Constitutional materiality requires that 
there be a showing that the suppressed or 
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues 
of whether the defendant is guilty of the 
charge and whether there is a fundamental 
unfairness that requires the Court to set 
aside the defendant's conviction. A 
corollary of this proposition is, -The 
mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense, or might have affected the 
outcome of the trial, does not establish 
•materiality' in the constitutional sense." 
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Aours, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976) and 
adding emphasis). 
Since Jiminez offered no evidence that a videotape of the 
alleged assault was made or of what it most likely showed, no one 
knows whether there was any evidence. Thus, we are left to 
speculate on whether any "evidence" was destroyed. If evidence was 
destroyed, its materiality—"evidentiary" or 
"constitutional"—cannot be determined. All defendant has is a mere 
possibility that there was something recorded which might have 
helped her defense. 
Because there was no showing that loss of the tape destroyed 
evidence vital to the issue of defendant's guilt, the trial court 
erred in dismissing the assault charge. We therefore vacate the 
order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. 




DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNIE JONES 
Deputy County Attorney 
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fit ED IN CLERK'S GFFiCe 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
JESSIE JIMENEZ, ^ 
Defendant, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. CR 87-777 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
evidence came on for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on 
the 21st day of August, 1987. The defendant was present and 
represented by James Bradshaw. The State was represented by Ernie 
Jones, Deputy County Attorney. The Court having heard the argument 
of counsel and having read the brief of both parties grants the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge of Assault by a 
Prisoner pursuant to 576-5-102.5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended is dismissed for the reason that the State failed to retain 
Order of Dismissal 
CR 87-777 
Page 2 
any video tape of the incident at the Salt Lake County Jail 
involving the defendant on March 13, 1987. 
DATED this ^ day of Juflubt7 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
c 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
P,i7 Werner 
I hereby certify that on this H T K day of August-; 198 7, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal 
to James Bradshaw, Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated 
below. 
CWR \ HWrs 
Secretary \j 
JAMES BRADSHAW 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Legal Defenders Association 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
cjb 
